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COPYRIGHT AND FEDERALISM: WHY STATE
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS THE
BEST REMEDY FOR STATE COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
Leroy Johnston Ellis V*
ABSTRACT— When a photographer intentionally takes a picture of a
subject, or a writer puts a story to paper, the resulting works are protected
by copyright. That protection is bolstered after the authors register their
works with the Copyright Office. All private parties, from individuals to
corporations, can be sued for infringing on the work should they use it
without pay or permission.
However, what happens when the infringer is not a private party?
What happens when the state or a state entity is the infringer? What
happens when a public university decides to use a copyright owner’s work
without pay or permission? Can the copyright owner seek damages from
the university for infringement? If not, then how can a copyright owner
recover damages for state infringement?
Until recently, the answer was that copyright owners could obtain
damages from the university for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Remedies Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. §511, but in Allen v.
Cooper, the United States Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional in
part because there was not enough evidence of state infringement to
support waiving sovereign immunity. Now the question has no clear
answer. While some state cases have copyright owners attempting to obtain
damages through alternative means, there does not seem to be an easy way
for copyright owners to obtain monetary relief for state copyright
infringement. National legislation could be proposed once again, but how
well would that fair against the Court’s current precedent? Would it be
better to ask the states to waive immunity themselves?
*
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Monetary remedies for wrongs should be available, even when the
wrong is committed by the state or its entities. The issue is finding a way
around sovereign immunity. Sometimes the way around sovereign
immunity is by using federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Andreas Gursky is a German photographer whose work has been
exhibited in roughly thirty-five countries.1 Imagine that Gursky decided to
take a picture of the New York City skyline. He charters a plane, readies
his camera, and gets what he thinks is the perfect shot of downtown
Manhattan. Gursky registers his photograph of New York with the United
States Copyright Office and displays it to the public. Sometime later, the
City University of New York acquires a copy of Gursky’s photograph and
uses it to advertise their Graduate School of Journalism. What remedies
could Andreas Gursky pursue?
While the situation above is only a hypothetical, it is a reality on the
ground for other copyright owners. Recently, the U.S. Copyright Office
issued a report to Congress regarding copyright and state sovereign
immunity. The general findings of the report stated that there were 132
cases filed against states for copyright infringement between 1986 and
2020.2 Of those cases, 128 were filed between 2000 and 2020, and 76 cases

1
See Exhibitions, ANDREAS GURSKY, https://www.andreasgursky.com/en/exhibitions/soloexhibitions [https://perma.cc/8MUL-8D9K].
2
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 28 (2021).
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were “brought against state-funded educational institutions.” 3 A total of
117 cases involved either literary works or “pictorial, graphic, or scriptural
works,” with nearly the same number of cases involving actions for money
damages.4 The report included survey results from the Copyright Alliance,5
which concluded that of 115 copyright owners reporting that a state or state
entity had infringed on their copyrights, 52% of those owners described
multiple instances of state infringement.6 Nearly sixty-percent identified the
infringers as “state universities or institutions of higher learning.” 7 The
report concluded that there is evidence indicating that state infringement is
a legitimate concern, but whether the evidence could establish patterns of
unconstitutional conduct was inconclusive.8 Additionally, the report noted
that the claims a copyright owner can bring against the state are either
untested, unlikely to succeed, or do not favor complete relief for the
owner.9 The conclusions are alarming for copyright owners because they
demonstrate that infringement is occurring at the hands of the state or its
entities at a seemingly increasing rate and copyright owners have no
remedy against it.
Copyright infringement requires a remedy no matter who the
infringing party may be. William Blackstone wrote that the general rule is
“that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or
action of law, whenever the right is invaded.”10 Chief Justice John Marshall
echoed this sentiment when he said that “[t]he very essence of civil
liberty . . . consists in the right of every individual to claim protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury,” and it is “one of the first duties
of government . . . to afford that protection” to the individual.11 The law
currently allows copyright owners to pursue monetary remedies for
copyright infringement; 12 however, when the state is the infringer, the
Supreme Court has held that monetary remedies are unavailable for
copyright owners because Congress has not abrogated sovereign

3

Id.
Id.
5
The Copyright Alliance is an organization that advocates for policies “that promote and preserve
the value of copyright” and seeks to protect “the rights of creators and innovators.” About, COPYRIGHT
ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/GL3Q-M885].
6
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 32.
7
Id. at 33.
8
Id. at 72–73.
9
Id. at 59–70.
10
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
11
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12
17 U.S.C. § 504.
4
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immunity. 13 While the Court’s ruling leaves copyright owners with an
injunction as a remedial option, this will not satisfy those owners seeking
monetary compensation for infringement of their copyrights.14
If copyright owners have a legal right to pursue monetary damages
whenever their protected material is infringed upon, 15 but sovereign
immunity bars those same remedies when the infringer is the state or a state
entity, then the next question is whether the monetary remedies are
available under a separate legal theory. If no theory exists, then the
injunction may be the only defense copyright owners have against state
infringement,16 barring some waiver of sovereign immunity. The purpose of
this paper is not to detail all the possible legal theories17 copyright owners
can use to obtain monetary remedies for state infringement. A remedy
already exists by statute, 18 but sovereign immunity prevents copyright
owners from obtaining that remedy in an action where the state or state
entity is the infringer.19 This is a problem requiring some kind of a solution.
In this paper, I argue that the best solution for copyright owners seeking to
enforce the monetary remedies already available to them under the
Copyright Act20 is state waiver of sovereign immunity.
This paper will present a survey of the current legal landscape. Part I
will address the problem of copyright infringement and sovereign
immunity as it currently exists. The Supreme Court’s holding that states
cannot be sued for copyright infringement is a relatively recent decision.21
A look at state infringement cases from before and after the decision can
help indicate what the current issue is and who the main culprits are in state
13

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
Jason Bloom, Annie Allison & Abbey Gauger, Texas Ruling Shows Weight of State Immunity /In
IP Claims, LAW360 (July 7, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1400522/texas-rulingshows-weight-of-state-immunity-in-ip-claims [https://perma.cc/973X-CRWM].
15
17 U.S.C. § 504.
16
Bloom, supra note 14.
17
I acknowledge that copyright owners can use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to justify a monetary remedy for state copyright infringement, but I will not address it in
this paper. The argument was recently raised at the district level in Canada Hockey LLC v. Texas A&M
University Athletic Department to no success. 484 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454–58 (S.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, No.
20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3,
2022) (No. 21-1603). In that case, a copyright owner sued Texas A&M for allegedly using an
unpublished manuscript of his book to enforce the university’s trademark on the 12th Man. Can.
Hockey, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976, at *2–6. The Fifth Circuit held that the owner’s procedural due
process rights were not violated because the owner’s claims could be brought in state court under the
Texas Takings Clause. Id. at *22.
18
17 U.S.C. § 504.
19
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
20
17 U.S.C. § 504.
21
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007.
14
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infringement cases. Part II of this paper will consider the Takings Clause as
a possible legal theory for monetary remedies when state copyright
infringement occurs. The Takings Clause allows private property owners to
seek a compensatory remedy when the state takes their property for public
use,22 and thus it can be used by copyright owners seeking to combat state
infringement of their copyrights. The Copyright Office noted that a Takings
claim was available to copyright owners, 23 but the theory has issues in
application. Lastly, in Part III I will propose that using federalism is the
best path for copyright owners seeking monetary remedies for state
infringement and address concerns, such as the Dormant Commerce Clause,
that may follow from the use of federalism. If copyright owners lobby for
specific waivers of state immunity for copyright infringement, then
copyright owners can easily seek the money damages afforded to them
under the Copyright Act24 against the state infringer.
I.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: THE REMEDY AND THE PROBLEM.

Generally, when a copyright owner deals with copyright infringement,
she has a statutory remedy for monetary damages.25 Whenever a protected
work is used in a way that tramples on the owner’s five exclusive rights,26
the Copyright Act is there with an avenue to recover monetary damages.27
All the owner has to do is prove infringement occurred and the money is
hers.
In theory, lawsuits for copyright infringement are available to
copyright owners no matter who the infringer might be. In practice,
however, copyright owners lack the ability to sue the state for copyright
infringement. The 2020 United States Supreme Court case, Allen v. Cooper,
held that states could not be sued for copyright infringement because
sovereign immunity had not been abrogated through any Congressional
act. 28 Allen was cited in later copyright infringement cases dealing with
state infringement of copyright, and has proven difficult for copyright
owners confronting state infringement.29
22

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 65–67.
24
17 U.S.C. § 504.
25
Id.
26
17 U.S.C §§ 106(1)–(5) (reproduction of the work; preparing derivatives based on the work;
distributing copies of the work; publicly performing the work; displaying the work).
27
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
28
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
29
See Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS
3976, at *17 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603);
Fowler v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. CV-20-01516-PHX-DJH, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112961, at *13–15
23
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A. Allen v. Cooper: What Happened?
In 1996, the marine salvage company, Intersal Inc., discovered the
wreckage of Blackbeard’s ship, the Queen Anne’s Revenge, off the coast of
North Carolina.30 The state of North Carolina contracted with Intersal to
recover the shipwreck, and Intersal charged videographer Frederick Allen
with documenting the operation.31 Allen documented the recovery for over
a decade, creating videos and photos of the diver’s salvaging efforts and
obtaining registered copyrights in all his recordings of the operation;
however, after Allen finished documenting the recovery, North Carolina
began publishing some of the photos and videos to the state’s website.32
The first time the infringement occurred, Allen and North Carolina worked
out a settlement agreement laying out what rights each party had to the
copyrighted material; nevertheless, the state infringed on Allen’s
copyrights a second time without admitting any wrongdoing, leading Allen
to sue the state for copyright infringement.33
At the time, Allen was able to bring his action under the Copyright
Remedies Clarification Act (CRCA) because the Act abrogated sovereign
immunity in favor of authors so they could sue the state for copyright
infringement.34 Allen argued CRCA was justifiable because Congress had
the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Intellectual Property
Clause and Due Process Clause.35 A similar argument was raised in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank. 36 In that case, College Savings Bank, a New Jersey savings bank,
held a patent for a financing methodology designed to help cover the cost
for college tuition. 37 They alleged that Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expenses Board, a state-created entity located in Florida that
provided similar services to Florida residents, infringed upon their patent.38
College Savings brought action against Florida Prepaid under the Patent
Remedy Act, arguing that the Act properly abrogated sovereign immunity
under the Due Process Clause; however, the Court was unconvinced by this
(D. Ariz. June 16, 2021); High Sch. Serviços Educacionais v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., No. 2:19CV-04083-BCW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241164, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2020).
30
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 999–1000.
35
Id. at 1001, 1003.
36
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 633–34
(1999).
37
Id. at 630–31.
38
Id. at 631.
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argument, and held that the Act was not a proper waiver of sovereign
immunity.39
In Allen, the Court relied heavily on Florida Prepaid and quickly
disposed of both the Intellectual Property Clause argument and the Due
Process argument. 40 In the same breath, the Court held that CRCA was
inapplicable because it could not be justified under any Congressional
power. 41 Thus, the Court barred Allen from suing North Carolina for
copyright infringement, and with it, all subsequent copyright owners lost
the ability to seek monetary remedies for state infringement.
B. The Past and the Present: State Infringement Before and After Allen.
Before CRCA, there were some copyright infringement cases brought
against the states or their entities, but the results varied. In Wihtol v. Crow,
the Clarinda School District in Iowa was accused of infringing on a
copyright owner’s song after one of their employees copied the song and
incorporated it into a new arrangement, after which it was performed by a
high school choir the employee directed. 42 The Eighth Circuit held the
district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the Clarinda School
District because of the Eleventh Amendment prevented lawsuits from being
brought against non-consenting states.43
Similar facts were present in other cases, but with different results. In
Mills Music Inc. v. Arizona, a copyright owner alleged that the state of
Arizona was party to copyright infringement after a musical compensation
was played by the Coliseum Board, an agency hired by the state to operate
a state fair.44 Although the Nineth Circuit acknowledged state waiver and
consent to lawsuits, they held that both the Copyright Clause and the
Copyright Act of 1909 properly abrogated sovereign immunity, noting that
“the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity does not permit a state to
nullify the rights reserved and protected by Congress, acting pursuant to the
[Copyright Clause].”45
Finally, in Johnson v. University of Virginia, a copyright owner
alleged that the University of Virginia and two of its employees infringed
on photographs the owner took at a sporting event. 46 The District Court
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 640–48.
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001–07.
Id. at 1007 (“Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today.”).
Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 778–80 (8th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 781–82.
Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1282–86.
Johnson v. Univ. of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Va. 1985).
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noted the split on copyright infringement and sovereign immunity but
ultimately concluded that the Copyright Act of 1976 waived the state’s
sovereign immunity “from liability for damages and equitable relief for
copyright infringement.” 47 While these cases illustrated an issue of state
infringement and sovereign immunity before CRCA, the case law appears
to demonstrate isolated incidences of state copyright infringement.
State copyright infringement remained after Congress passed CRCA,
but compared to the prior cases, the state infringement appeared more
concentrated. Instead of the infringers being the school employees48 or the
state itself, 49 the state infringers were primarily public universities and
university systems.50 However, unlike Mills Music and Johnson, where the
courts found an abrogation of sovereign immunity through the Copyright
Act, 51 the circuit courts did not see CRCA as a waiver of sovereign
immunity.52 Thus, rather than having a circuit split on Congressional waiver
of sovereign immunity, the state was allowed to infringe upon the
copyrights held by copyright owners before Allen because the rulings
amongst the circuit courts agreed that CRCA did not waive sovereign
immunity for copyright infringement.
Nothing has changed since Allen struck down CRCA. Public schools
are still infringing on copyrighted material.53 As previously noted, the U.S.
Copyright Office reported that nearly sixty-percent of infringers were state
or public universities; 54 however, whether Congress can take action and
waive sovereign immunity is questionable because the small number of
state infringement cases renders the evidence remains inconclusive.55 The
47

Id. at 322–24.
Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 778.
49
Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1280.
50
See Dermansky v. Univ. of Colo., 445 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1220 (D. Colo. 2020) (the University of
Colorado); Nettleman v. Fla. Atlantic Univ. Bd. of Trs., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1305–07 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
(Florida Atlantic University); Coyle v. Univ. of Ky., 2 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1016 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (the
University of Kentucky); Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharm. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633
F.3d 1297, 1301–06 (11th Cir. 2011) (the University System of Georgia); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of
Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674, 676–77 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (the University of Arkansas); Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000) (the University of Houston).
51
Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285; Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 323.
52
See Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharm., 633 F.3d at 1301–06; see also Chavez, 204 F.3d at 603.
53
See Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 1362 (2022) (the University of Houston); Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath.
Dep’t, 484 F. Supp. 3d 448, 451–53 (S.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS
3976 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603) (Texas
A&M University Athletic Department); High Sch. Serviços Educionais v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo.,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241164 at *1–3 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (the University of Missouri).
54
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 33.
55
Id. at 72–73.
48
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scanty evidence was the primary reason why the Court held that CRCA
could not be justified as a waiver of sovereign immunity under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 While the decision is a good compass for
drafting future legislation, it is also a hazard for Congress, should they wish
to draft a new bill with the same effect as CRCA.
The Allen decision is still relatively fresh, and the full consequences of
the case are yet to be determined, but Allen leaves copyright owners with
useful dicta that can be used for future litigation. In the decision, the Court
stated that “copyrights are a form of property.”57 Property owners can raise
claims against the state for harm done to their property by the state under
either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 58 or the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 59 While arguments for Due
Process claims exist,60 the Takings claims seem to be the easier candidate
for the copyright owner, if he desires to seek monetary damages for state
copyright infringement. The Copyright Office listed a Takings claim as a
possible remedy for copyright owners in state court.61 The question is how
successful the claim will be.
II. TAKINGS CLAIMS: IS STATE INFRINGEMENT A TAKING?
As acknowledged by the Copyright Office, a copyright owner may
bring a Takings claim against the state for copyright infringement. 62 A
Takings claim was asserted in Allen at the district level,63 and Takings has
been addressed in at least one other federal case.64 While it is considered a
56

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 949, 1007 (2020).
Id. at 1004.
58
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property without
due process of law. . . .”).
59
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. . . .”).
60
See Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, 484 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454–58 (S.D. Tex.
2020), aff’d, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91
U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603); see also Brief for Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Can. Hockey, LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, No. 20-20503, 2021 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27012 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2021); John T. Cross, Suing the States for Copyright Infringement,
39 BRANDEIS L.J. 337, 399–410 (2000); Davida H. Isaacs, Shifting Constitutional Sands: Can and
Should Patentholders Rely on the Due Process Clause to Thwart Government Action?, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 627, 648–54 (2008).
61
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 65–67.
62
Id.
63
Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 531 (E.D.N.C. 2017). The claim was barred by precedent.
See Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 551–53 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that because a Takings claim
could be brought in state court, the Eleventh Amendment barred a Takings claim in federal court).
64
Can. Hockey, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976, at *24–25. This claim was also barred by precedent.
See Bay Point Props. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 454, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that
57
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viable option to remedy state infringement, successfully using the Takings
Clause against the state in copyright infringement cases is questionable.
The Takings Clause is designed to compensate private property
owners when the state takes their property for public use.65 The practice
itself is as old as Rome. 66 American jurisprudence, having inherited and
relied upon English law since the colonial era,67 can trace a framework of
Takings as far back as the Magna Carta, which provided that personal
property could not be taken by the King without first compensating the
owner.68 However, the genesis of Takings involves tangible property, not
intellectual property. Copyright is of the latter.69
If copyright owners use the Takings Clause against the state in
copyright infringement cases, the first question is the applicability of the
Takings Clause to intangible property in general. Copyright owners can
establish that intangible property can be subjected to a Taking by relying
on Supreme Court cases that hold intangible property can be subjected to
the eminent domain powers of the Fifth Amendment.70 Thus, the question
of intangibles being subjected to eminent domain poses no issue.
If intangible property in general can be taken under the power of
eminent domain, then the next question should focus on the applicability of
eminent domain to intellectual property specifically. The first Supreme
Court case tackling that issue was Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company. In
sovereign immunity barred Takings claims in federal court, and thus a Takings claim must be pursued
in state court).
65
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66
See generally SUSAN REYNOLDS, BEFORE EMINENT DOMAIN: TOWARD A HISTORY OF
EXPROPRIATION OF LAND FOR THE COMMON GOOD 15–84 (2010). While Reynolds references 2 Samuel
as a place where an example of a Taking is found, id. at 10, her historical tracking of Takings begins
with Roman law and proceeds through Western Europe, both before and after 1100, id. at 15–76. Her
research found evidence of, what she calls, expropriation in various European countries, including
France, Italy, and Germany. Id. at 54–76.
67
E.g. Clayland’s Lessee v. Pearce, 1 H. & McH. 29 (Md. 1714) (relying on the parliamentary
statute relating to frauds, 29 Car. II, to conclude a case in favor of the plaintiff); see also Lloyd’s Lessee
v. Hemsley, 1 H. & McH. 28 (Md. 1712) (holding that if a statute of limitations from England, 1623, 21
Jac. 1 c. 16 §§ 3, 4, 7, neither extended to Maryland nor was applicable to the case, then the contested
land went to the plaintiff).
68
MAGNA CARTA cl. 28 (“No constable or other bailiff of ours is to take the corn or other chattels
of anyone, unless he immediately gives money for this, or is able to have a delay with the consent of the
seller.”).
69
1 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § A.05(D) (“[C]opyright forms one species of
[intellectual property].”).
70
See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1949) (holding that the trade
routes used by a business were taken when the place of business was temporarily taken for the use and
benefit of the United States Army); see also West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1848)
(holding that the state of Vermont could take a franchise through the power of eminent domain, even
though a franchise is an intangible and incorporeal property right).
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that case, a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) was challenged as unconstitutional because it authorized the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “to use data submitted by an
applicant for registration of a pesticide” and to disclose some of the
submitted data to the public. 71 The Monsanto Company made pesticides
and applied for registration with the EPA; however, they wanted to protect
the trade secrets in their products, and so they challenged the FIFRA
provision under the Takings Clause.72 Although the Court did not hold that
the provision was unconstitutional, it held that intangible property rights
protected under state law deserved protection under the Takings Clause.73
With trade secret being the intangible property interest in Monsanto74 and a
kind of intellectual property right, 75 the Court opened the door for
subjecting intellectual property to Takings claims.
More specifically, if one form of intellectual property can be subjected
to a Fifth Amendment Taking, does that mean that other forms of
intellectual property can be subjected to the same? The current answer
appears to be “Yes.” In James v. Campbell, the Supreme Court expressed
certainty that patents for inventions are protected from appropriation or use
by the government without compensation, just as land patents are protected
under the same principles.76 Although the case is old, the Court recently
quoted the same section from James to support their position that personal
property is protected under the Takings Clause. 77 With copyrights and
patents sharing the same clause of the Constitution,78 suggestions can be
made that copyrights may enjoy the same protection as patents under the
Takings Clause.
The suggestions that the Takings Clause applies to copyright are not
limited to the Supreme Court. Some federal courts have indicated in dicta
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984).
Id. at 999–1000.
73
Id. at 1003.
74
Id. at 999–1000.
75
See 1 ROGER M. MILGRAM, Milgrim ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (2021) (“One’s rights in a trade
secret are intangible intellectual property.”).
76
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1882) (“That the government of the United States
when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt.”).
77
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359–60 (2015) (conducting, prior to the Court’s
quotation, a detailed history of Takings dating back to the Magna Carta, with the court concluding that
“[n]othing in this history suggests that personal property was any less protected against physical
appropriation than real property”).
78
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72
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that they are warm to the idea of granting such protection to copyrights.79
The Second Circuit has expressly stated that copyright interests are
property rights “protected by the due process and [Takings] clauses of the
Constitution.”80 However, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide whether the
Takings Clause protected copyright partially because the Supreme Court
has not ventured to answer the question of Takings and copyright. 81
Regardless of the differences between the circuits, Professor Roberta Kwall
writes that states have eminent domain power over copyright and can
therefore subject copyright to a Taking. 82 Thus, although the Supreme
Court has yet to consider the matter, there is authority, both legal and
scholastic, suggesting copyright can be subjected to a Fifth Amendment
Taking.
The final question is whether copyright infringement constitutes a
Taking. Kwall, after thoroughly analyzing the concepts of fair use and just
compensation, concluded that because of the government’s ability to
exercise eminent domain power over copyright, “any unauthorized use not
falling within the fair use or other statutory exception constitutes a
Taking.” 83 Recently, however, the Texas Supreme Court held that
infringement is not a Taking in their case Jim Olive Photography v.
University of Houston.84 With scholarship now meeting the application of
law, it is worth breaking down the facts and rational of the Texas decision.
A. Jim Olive Photography: The Facts and the Decision.
In 2005, Jim Olive took arial photographs of the City of Houston “and
displayed them on his website for purchase.” 85 He registered the
photographs with the United States Copyright Office before displaying
them, and made notice to others that unauthorized use of the images was
“strictly prohibited.” 86 However, Olive alleged that the University of
79

See Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (listing the Takings
Clause as an available avenue for remedies that a copyright owner could bring against the state for
copyright infringement).
80
Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983).
81
Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976,
at *23 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603).
82
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign’s
Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 703–11 (1989); see also Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings
Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973, 981–86 (2015) (arguing that because of Monsanto and the
characteristics of copyrights, the Takings Clause has a limited application to copyrights).
83
Id. at 752.
84
Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. 2021), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022).
85
Id. at 768.
86
Id.
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Houston downloaded a copy of his picture, The Cityscape, “removed all
identifying copyright and attribution material,” and displayed the image
“on several webpages to promote [their] C.T. Bauer College of Business.”87
While the University removed the photograph from its website after Olive
demanded they cease and desist their use of The Cityscape, Olive sued the
University for compensation, alleging that the University engaged in an
unlawful Taking of his copyright.88
Jim Olive argued that the Takings Clause protected copyright from
appropriation by the state and that the University of Houston took his
property when the institution published the photograph on their webpage.89
The University countered that infringement merely violated Olive’s
copyrights but did not “confiscate or appropriate those rights.”90 The Court
recognized that property “is the bundle of rights that describes one’s
relationship to a thing and not the thing itself,” while also acknowledging
that the property at issue was Olive’s copyright, not the photograph. 91
Because the property at issue was copyright, the Court said property rights
are governed by the Copyright Act; however, under the same statute, those
rights are not destroyed when violated by the government.92 Infringement
violates the rights reserved to copyright owners, but the infringer does not
assume any physical control over the copyrights through his infringement.93
The nature of copyright makes it non-rivalrous, and thus others can use
copyrighted material without depriving anyone else of its use.94 Because of
this non-rivalrous nature and the nature of infringement, the Court held that
there was no Taking of Olive’s copyright. Olive retained his five exclusive
rights, even if infringement trespassed on his “exclusive domain.”95 Thus,
the Court concluded that state copyright infringement did not amount to a
Taking.96

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id. at 769–70.
90
Id. at 771.
91
Id. at 773–74.
92
Id. at 774.
93
Id. at 775.
94
Id. at 776.
95
Id. at 776–77.
96
Id. at 777 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)).
The concurrence noted that Olive’s Takings claim would have been stronger had the infringement
occurred in a more public forum where money damages became an issue, such as passing copyrighted
books out to students for free; however, because damages for copyright infringement were not claimed,
the Takings claim was weakened. Id. at 782 (Busby, J., Concurring).
88
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B. What Matters When Taking a Copyright?
The Texas Court’s decision raises an interesting question that will be
important for any future claim alleging that copyright infringement is a
Taking of copyright: Does the state need to take any one of the five
exclusive copyrights 97 in order for a copyright to be taken through the
power of eminent domain? If Kwall is correct and “any unauthorized use
not falling within the fair use or other statutory exception constitutes a
Taking,”98 then the state does not need to take any of the five exclusive
rights to execute a Taking of copyright. Instead, if the state committed
copyright infringement, then the act of infringing on the copyright would
constitute a Taking.99 If, however, one or more of the five exclusive rights
must be taken in order for a Taking of copyright to occur, then the Texas
Supreme Court is correct and infringement is not a Taking.100
1. Mossoff and Madison: A Contemporary Argument.
While the Takings Clause states that private property shall not be
taken by the state for public use without just compensation,101 determining
the applicability of the Clause to copyright seems an open question.
Professor Adam Mossoff wrote an amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals where he argued that copyrights and patents were both recognized
as property in American law as far back as the Framers, and the history
thus makes copyrights a protected property under the Takings Clause. 102
Mossoff’s argument in part relies on James Madison, who defended the
Copyright Clause by stating that “[t]he copyright of authors has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law.” 103
Mossoff also relied on an article Madison wrote on property, where he
claimed that if property is the dominion that man claimed and exercised
over things in the world to the exclusion of all others, then in a broad sense
“a man has property in his opinions” and “may be equally said to have a
property in his rights.”104 In Madison’s view, the duty of government was to
preserve and protect the property of its citizens, and if property includes the

97

17 U.S.C § 106(1)–(5).
Kwall, supra note 82, at 751.
99
Id.
100
Jim Olive, 624 S.W.3d at 776–77.
101
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102
Brief for Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Can. Hockey, LLC v. Tex.
A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, No. 20-20503, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 27012 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2021).
103
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
104
JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS
LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
98
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interest the people have to enjoy their opinions and rights, then it follows
government must protect the opinions and rights of the people. 105 Thus,
Madison argued, at no point are the people to be deprived of these rights
without just compensation.106
Mossoff’s reliance on Madison appears applicable to cases involving
state infringement of copyrights, but two problems arise for this type of
justification that copyrights are property protected by the Takings Clause.
First, Madison relies on a labor theory of property to conclude that the
people’s property, including their opinions and rights, cannot be taken
without just compensation.107 Even though this view was likely informed by
Blackstone,108 the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected a labor
theory for copyright in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Company, preferring instead the idea/expression dichotomy for works of
authorship because “[i]t is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.”109 Thus, the Court held, the idea/expression
dichotomy has greater compatibility with the Copyright Clause itself than
does the labor theory of property. 110 The Clause had the same verbiage
when Madison defended it. 111 Those favoring Mossoff’s argument must
contend with the idea/expression dichotomy of copyright where Takings
claims are concerned. They may also have to answer why Madison at first
defends a constitutional provision favoring the dichotomy 112 but also
embraces a labor theory of property that broadly extends to many
intangibles.113
A second issue is with Madison’s assertion that people have a
property interest in their opinions and rights.114 The notion that people have
a property interest in their “opinions and communications,” as Madison put
it,115 implies that people have a property interest in their freedom of speech
because speech is a way in which opinions are expressed and
communication is conducted. In the same article, Madison claims people
105

Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
107
See id.
108
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405–06 (“When a man by the exertion of his
rational powers has produced an original work, he has clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as
he pleases, and any attempt to take it from him, or vary the disposition he has made of it, is an invasion
of his right of property.”).
109
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
110
Id. at 349–50.
111
MADISON, supra note 104.
112
See id.
113
See id. at 101–03.
114
Id. at 101.
115
Id.
106
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have a property interest in their religious beliefs, 116 thus inferring that
people have a property interest in their First Amendment rights because
opinions, communications, and religious beliefs are protected by the text.117
While a property interest in First Amendment rights can be an interest in
intangible items because rights such as opinions and communications do
not necessarily require a fixed tangible medium to be expressed, the idea
itself seems both questionable and difficult to apply under our current
jurisprudence. The idea is questionable because under Board of Regents v.
Roth, a property interest is “not created by the Constitution,” but is instead
created and defined “by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.”118 Madison’s idea that people have
property interest in their rights appears novel and without reference to any
independent sources, thus leaving an argument relying on his essay
questionable.
Secondly, the current Takings law views a person’s relation to
property under a bundle of rights theory, where the denial or destruction of
one right does not amount to a Taking when the owner retains possession
of the full bundle.119 If a person’s relation to property is a bundle of rights
theory, and people have a property interest in their rights, then viewing
rights themselves as property becomes a question of “What rights from the
bundle of rights were acquired or destroyed by the state when they took the
person’s rights?” The question is metaphysical and seems difficult to apply
to a Takings analysis in a copyright case because it amounts to nonsense.
Thus, Mossoff’s argument, so far as it relies on Madison’s views of
property, seems difficult to defend.
2. Epstein and Locke: A Theoretical Argument.
Madison is not without use for those searching for an answer to
copyright and Takings. If Madison was informed by Blackstone, then
tracing the line backwards reveals Blackstone based his theory of copyright
on John Locke’s labor theory. 120 Locke’s views on property 121 and the
legislature’s power to take it 122 remain relevant in the current Takings

116

Id. at 103.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]; or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .”).
118
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
119
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
120
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 108.
121
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION,
110–120 (Digireads.com Pub. 2015) (1690).
122
See id. at 158.
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discussion because they inform the views of Professor Richard Epstein.123
According to Epstein, a taking of private property must be justified to avoid
the compensation requirement, and the taking must be limited by the public
use requirement so that the people may fully enjoy their life, liberty, and
estates.124 Epstein claims a prima facie Taking occurs whenever the rights
of the property owner are diminished, and a partial Taking occurs
whenever any one of three rights of the private property owner –
possession, use, or disposition – are taken.125 Importantly, his main concern
is not what is retained by the property owner, but what is taken by the
state.126 Thus, the focus should be on what the state or its entities came into
possession, use, or disposition of that once belong to a private property
owner.
If the Takings Clause is read with Epstein’s commitment to the
Lockean interpretation of property, then it seems a different question needs
consideration in Jim Olive. The Texas Supreme Court emphasized Olive’s
retention of his exclusive copyrights but did not focus on the taking of the
picture because Olive did not allege his photo was taken but that his
copyright was taken. 127 If the photo was taken, then it appears
compensation is required because the taking is unjustified, and the use by a
public university arguably satisfies the public use requirement.128 However,
while the taking of the photograph would satisfy the first question of
Epstein’s analysis of the Takings Clause, 129 it does not appear that the
taking of the photograph implies a Taking of the copyright under Epstein’s
view. To be a Taking, the taking of the photograph must result in either a
deprivation of possession, use, or disposition, or the diminishment of rights
in the property owner.130 It is not clear that taking the photograph results in
123
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
31 (1985).
124
See id. at 162–63.
125
See id. at 57.
126
See id.
127
Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hou. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 774–76 (Tex. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022).
128
See Epstein, supra note 123, at 162–70 (defining public use by reference to the elements of
public goods—exclusivity and zero marginal costs). If the university physically took Olive’s
photograph, then it would take anywhere between a single unit from the surplus of copies of the
photograph to all possible copies. Once the photograph is used by the university, it would provide the
public access to that specific photograph for little to no cost. The university thus deprives Olive of
exclusive possession of however many copies were taken, and it can produce more copies of the
photograph for public consumption at almost no additional cost. The use could be granting public
access to the photograph, such as displaying it in a hallway, or actions that mirror private use, such as
advertising the Business school. Both types of use would require compensation under Epstein’s theory.
129
Id. at 31 (“Is there a taking of private property?”).
130
See id. at 57.
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either for the copyright. Thus, while Epstein can help narrow the necessary
question in a Takings claim, the narrow question seems to best fit tangible
property rather than intangible rights.
3. Uniting the Views: A Third Argument?
Mossoff and Epstein are not without merit to formulate a Takings
argument. Mossoff’s argument demonstrates that people can have an
intangible property interest in tangible items because things such as
communications and opinions131 can be put onto a fixed tangible medium,
which could potentially grant them copyright protection. 132 Epstein’s
consideration of what is taken 133 appears to have its best application to
tangible property, and tangible property can carry with it an intangible
interest, such as copyright protection.134 If the question is what was taken
and not what was retained, and a tangible item can possess an intangible
property interest, then viewing the issue as a Taking of tangible property
carrying intangible rights might provide some use for copyright owners.
For example, if a book is printed, then it is a tangible form of personal
property with intangible rights attached to it because copyright protection
applies to the work.135 Normally, if there are intangible rights attached to
tangible property, then just compensation may be required when the
tangible property is taken.136 While the transfer of the object protected by
copyright is not itself a transfer of copyright from the author to the person
receiving the object,137 that does not negate the fact that the tangible object
still has the five exclusive rights attached to its use. 138 Because these
intangible rights are attached to a tangible object, it could be argued that
when the state or its entities takes personal property protected by copyright,
and then uses the property in an infringing manner without paying the
copyright owner, there exists a Taking of the owner’s intangible rights in
the tangible property without just compensation.139 Thus, even in situations
where the five copyrights themselves are retained by the owner, using
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See MADISON, supra note 104, at 102.
17 U.S.C § 102.
133
Epstein, supra note 123, at 57.
134
17 U.S.C. § 102.
135
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
136
See 2 PHILIP NICHOLS ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.03(6)(a) (2021) (noting that
intangible interests and property may be acquired through eminent domain, thus requiring compensation,
and providing a list of intangible interests in real property that are later addressed).
137
17 U.S.C. § 202.
138
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(5).
139
Epstein, supra note 123, at 57.
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Epstein’s approach to focus on what was taken instead of retained140 can
offer the copyright owner an avenue for Takings claims.
However, issues abound with viewing the taking of copyright as a
taking of an intangible interest on tangible property. Firstly, while
copyrights are intangible rights attached to tangible property, arguing that
those rights require just compensation when the state takes the tangible
property the rights attach to is evidently flawed. For example, compare
copyrights to a lien, an intangible interest that attaches to tangible personal
property. Like copyright, 141 a lien is subject to the powers of eminent
domain. 142 The difference between copyrights and liens on personal
property is that liens do not necessarily apply universally to all
reproductions of the personal property subject to the lien, while copyrights
apply to all reproductions of the copyrighted material.143 Suppose Nissan
produced five Altimas of the same make and model. Depending on what
contracts are active at the time of production, a lien could apply to all or
none of the five Altimas produced. But if Stephen King publishes the same
five copies of The Shining, then copyright protection applies to all five
copies at the same time, even if there is a contract granting or licensing the
copyright to a third-party.144 A property interest through a lien is limited to
what is named in the contract for the lien. Copyright protection has no such
limitation.
The second issue is that, even if copyright owners successfully
analogize copyrights to intangible interests on personal property that are
worthy of just compensation, not everyone agrees with Epstein’s views on
property. For example, Professor Ghosh has considered how the views of
Epstein and other property theorists might apply to intellectual property in
the context of the Takings Clause.145 A court may not adopt Epstein’s views,
and instead adopt a differing view, such as those that favor balancing
efficiency and fairness146 over what was taken.147 There is no guarantee such
a view will work in the favor of copyright owners.
140

Id.
Kwall, supra note 82, at 703–11.
142
Nichols, supra note 136, § 5.03(6)(c).
143
17 U.S.C. § 102.
144
17 U.S.C. § 203.
145
Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left
Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 665–87 (2000) (analyzing
various views on Takings, such as Epstein’s theory and a theory of balancing efficiency and fairness,
before considering how they function under the Takings Clause).
146
Id. at 675–79. According to Professor Ghosh, under an efficiency/fairness balance, judges
determine whether a Taking has occurred by addressing “the state regulation and loss of value to the
property owner directly on a case-by-case basis,” but they do not start with “the presumption that
private property itself is in special need of protection.”
141
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It is possible these Takings issues could be adverted by making
analogies to patents instead of intangible interests. Just as some court
holdings imply that patents are personal property that can be subjected to a
Taking, the same view can be extended to argue that copyrights are
personal property that can be subjected to a Taking.148 Because American
jurisprudence is descended from English law, which includes the provision
in Magna Carta that demands compensation for the taking of personal
property,149 it is possible viewing copyrights as personal property would
change the analysis.
Moreover, the history of American patent law lends the analogy more
weight. According to Professor Mossoff, past patent cases included
damages being awarded to patentees “for an unauthorized governmental
use of his patented invention.” 150 This view on patents prevailed even
against sovereign immunity, and placed patent rights within the security of
the Takings Clause. 151 It is only with the “bundle of rights” theory of
property that this belief began to change.152 The bundle of rights theory was
embraced by the Texas Supreme Court,153 but in so embracing the theory,
they neglected the views of the past that could have better informed their
decision. Both patent and copyright are given a special place within the
same constitutional clause.154 It is not unreasonable to analogize the two
property interests to determine the protection of copyright under the
Takings Clause, nor is the highest court in a single state barred from using
older federal decisions to inform its rational on a Takings issue. Thus, the
Texas Supreme Court could have relied on prior decisions on patents and
Takings when ruling on copyright and Takings.155 Had the court done so,
147

Epstein, supra note 123, at 57.
Matthew Zorn & Shane Pennington, Questions Raised By Laws That Use Copyrighted
Standards, LAW360, https://www.law360.com/articles/1069389/questions-raised-by-laws-that-usecopyrighted-standards [https://perma.cc/E582-AH22]; see also Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings
Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973, 983 (2015) (stating that “copyrights are usually classified as personal
property”).
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Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 703 (2007).
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Id. at 704–5.
152
Id. at 715–16.
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Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 775–76 (Tex. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022).
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18–36 (2007) (arguing that patents are not property that are subject to protection under the Takings
Clause, and that the historical record is inconclusive as to whether patents were ever considered
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they may have concluded that copyright infringement was a Taking, just as
the old patent cases held patent infringement was a Taking.156
Although this analogy has some help from the Supreme Court through
their decision in Allen,157 the question of Takings itself remains a mess.
Professor Davida Isaacs noted that some commentators have called the
Court’s decisions on regulator Takings “muddled” and inconsistent in how
it describes the requirements necessary for a Taking. 158 Worse still is
analyzing a Takings claim against a fair use defense because the
jurisprudence on fair use is equally difficult with its elements.159 Because of
the messy nature of the Takings jurisprudence and the additional issue of
determining fair use,160 a decision from the Supreme Court may be of little
to no help for state and federal courts. A Takings case involving obvious
infringement would be straight forward, but one involving a fair use
defense may result in a complicated decision.
The final issue involves the courts themselves and sovereign
immunity. If a Takings claim can be raised against the state, then the action
is most likely limited to state court, even though copyright is protected by
federal law. 161 The reason is that a swath of cases in the United States
courts of appeals hold that sovereign immunity bars Takings claims against
the state in federal court because the same claims can be brought in state
court. 162 Copyright owners may find comfort in knowing that not every
circuit has addressed the issue, but some of those same circuits have district
courts that are warm to the decisions already rendered in the sister
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Mossoff, supra note 150, at 703.
See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000–07 (using a patent infringement case to decide a
copyright infringement case).
158
Isaacs, supra note 155, at 17.
159
Kwall, supra note 82, at 716–17.
160
17 U.S.C. § 107.
161
17 U.S.C. § 101.
162
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circuits.163 While the Takings Clause may be invoked in federal courts to
permit damages against a state employee in her individual capacity,164 a
preliminary injunction is currently the only guaranteed remedy in federal
court for copyright infringement actions against the state.165 An injunction
will not help any copyright owner seeking money damages against the state
for copyright infringement. If copyright owners cannot utilize the federal
courts for a Takings claim, then the best they can hope for is to win in state
court on the same argument.166 However, as Jim Olive Photography has
demonstrated, 167 copyright owners may fare no better bringing Takings
claims in state court than they would in federal court. Thus, the entire
exercise becomes blind shooting.
At the current moment, at least four federal circuits have yet to
definitively rule on whether sovereign immunity bars a Takings claim
against the state in federal court. 168 Regardless, the problems a Takings
claim will face with the muddled Takings jurisprudence 169 and fair use
considerations170 shows there is no guarantee a decision on state Takings of
copyright in the event of infringement will make sense, let alone be decided.
It is likely that if the owners cannot establish that infringement is a Taking,
then they will never get the claim through court, assuming the courts will
allow the Takings claim to be brought. The uncertainty of the state courts
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See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 40–41
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Amendment bars a Fifth Amendment Takings claim, the authority from the sister circuits is
overwhelmingly in favor of the bar).
164
Id. at 42–43.
165
See Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 479–80 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that
the Eleventh Amendment argument raised against the Takings claim was unpersuasive because the
cases relied upon for the argument included monetary damages, whereas the case at bar involved a
preliminary injunction).
166
If the Takings claim is initially brought in federal court and dismissed on grounds of sovereign
immunity, the copyright owner is not barred from bringing the Takings claim in state court. Sovereign
immunity prevents the federal courts from having jurisdiction over the Takings claims, and lack of
jurisdiction is grounds for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(a) states that when a court’s ruling on a claim is a judgment of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, a plaintiff is not barred from another action on the same claim. Thus, a federal court
dismissing a Takings claim for lack of jurisdiction under sovereign immunity will not prevent the
copyright owner from bringing the same claim in state court.
167
Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 776–77 (Tex. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022).
168
Those Circuits are the First, the Second, the Third, and the Eighth. See J. P. Burleigh, Can State
Governments Claim Sovereign Immunity in Takings Cases?, U. CIN. L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://uclawreview.org/2020/01/15/can-state-governments-claim-sovereign-immunity-in-takings-cases/
[https://perma.cc/R5QM-B7RR].
169
See Isaacs, supra note 155, at 17.
170
See Kwall, supra note 82, at 721–53.
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first allowing and then ruling favorable on a Takings claim for copyright
owners seeking a monetary remedy for state infringement does not seem
like the best gamble for the owners; and yet, it is the state level where
copyright owners should focus their time to pursue a remedy.
III. COPYRIGHT AND FEDERALISM: THE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE.
There is some pessimism regarding monetary remedies for state
copyright infringement. Professor Runhua Wang writes that Allen creates
an imbalance in bargaining power because copyright owners are now
barred from suing the state for infringement.171 Thus, copyright owners are
left to sue in state courts, where the laws are inconsistent and the cases may
be unsuccessful. 172 Furthermore, while Allen permits private parties to
litigate in state court, sovereign immunity can still protect state entities
from litigation after they have engaged in copyright infringement.173 This
problem was illustrated by Jim Olive, leaving at best injunctive relief as the
sole remedy available in state court. 174 However, none of this means
copyright owners cannot convince the legislature to pass laws in their favor.
Rather, the rulings of Allen and Jim Olive show that if copyright owners
want to hold states and state entities liable for infringement, they need a
better legal theory and strategy to get around sovereign immunity.
A. Congress: Where the National Power Resides.
The legal strategy starts with location, and the most obvious place to
look is to the federal government. Although the Supreme Court struck
down CRCA because Congress had no basis on which to justify an
abdication of state sovereign immunity, 175 that does not mean that other
laws allowing private citizens to bring action against states for copyright
infringement cannot be made. Copyright owners can lobby Congress to
pass another statute similar to the CRCA, and Congress could again
attempt to justify it through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, whether a Due Process justification is successful is
an open question because if the states bring the case to the Supreme Court
again, Allen may return as the guiding precedent and strike the law down.176
Congress will need proof that copyrights are under threat by states or state
171
Runhua Wang, Modify State “Piracy” After Allen: Introducing Apology to the U.S. Copyright
Regime, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 494 (2021).
172
Id. at 500–01.
173
Id. at 508–09, 516.
174
Bloom, supra note 14.
175
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
176
Id. at 1003–07.
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entities because it was that lack of adequate proof that led the Court to
strike down CRCA. 177 Absent sufficient evidence of states infringing on
copyrights, any new federal legislation would likely require a different
justification. While the U.S. Copyright Office has provided their report on
state infringement to Congress, their inconclusive findings leave future
legislation with questionable odds of survival.178
If the evidence of state copyright infringement is wanting, then a new
legal theory is required to justify further Congressional legislation. With
the right legal minds and maneuvering, Congress could claim that new
legislation abrogating sovereign immunity for copyright infringement is
justified through the Takings Clause as incorporated by the Due Process
Clause. Kwall states that appealing to sovereign immunity “to preclude
[copyright owners] from suing states for damages in federal court violate[s]
the fifth amendment’s [Takings Clause], which binds the states through the
fourteenth amendment.” 179 The Takings Clause, if not by name, has in
principle applied to the states through the Due Process Clause for over a
hundred years,180 and the applicability of the Clause to copyright has some
support from the courts of appeals.181 If copyright falls under the power of
eminent domain at both the state and federal level,182 and the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the Takings Clause applicable to the states, then it
appears Congress has fertile grounds for drafting new legislation that
allows copyright owners to sue states for copyright infringement on a
theory suggesting state infringement amounts to a Taking without just
compensation.
Ideally, the theory that the Takings Clause could justify abrogating
sovereign immunity in copyright infringement cases would work; however,
there remains no guarantee that the legislation would survive scrutiny from
the Supreme Court. If new legislation cannot survive before the Court, then
the legal strategy for copyright owners is to abandon the pursuit of new
legislation and instead lobby for an amendment to existing legislation.
Professor Michael Landau, for example, proposes an addition to 28 U.SC.
177

Id. at 1004–07.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 72–73.
179
Kwall, supra note 82, at 755.
180
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (“In our opinion, a
judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the
State or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon
principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the State
is a denial by that State of a right secured to the owner by that instrument.”) (emphasis added).
181
See Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989); Roth v. Pritikin, 710
F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983).
182
See Kwall, supra note 82, at 703–11.
178
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§ 1338 that would grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases where
states or arms of the state may be sued by private persons when intellectual
property rights are violated or taken. 183 His proposal invokes just
compensation language found in the Takings Clause and would prevent
sovereign immunity from barring the suit.184 All Congress would have to do
is specify the violations of intellectual property rights and then expressly
use the Fourteenth Amendment while drafting the proposed provision.185
Landau’s idea could work because it would make the legislation
distinguishable from CRCA, since his proposal expands the jurisdiction of
the federal courts rather than the protections of copyright. Expanding
jurisdiction would making it harder to strike down the law under the
current precedent governing state copyright infringement, 186 but
amendments to existing laws face the same challenges as the creation of
new ones. Landau admits that under a constitutional immunity theory of the
Eleventh Amendment, Congress “lacks . . . the power to change the scope
of suits permissible in federal court.”187 While sovereign immunity may be
waived,188 there is nothing in the Constitution that allows Congress to waive
sovereign immunity on behalf of the states, and it seems that under a
constitutional immunity theory, the case for waiver would need to be strong.
If the Court took to this theory of the Eleventh Amendment, Landau’s
proposed addition to Section 1338 would need strong teeth or else it would
likely fall because it attempts to expand the scope of permissible suits and
simultaneously waive immunity on behalf of the states.189
Another issue with relying on Congress is their current record on
addressing state infringement issues. Congress has remained silent on
legislation concerning patent infringement since Florida Prepaid struck
down regulations against states for patent infringement.190 It seems unlikely
they will become vocal now that Allen has done the same for copyright
infringement.191 If Congress has not moved to make or amend legislation to
protect patents since the turn of the century, it is unlikely they will move to
183

Michael Landau, State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property Revisited, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 513, 563–64 (2012).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 563.
186
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004–07 (2020).
187
Landau, supra note 183, at 526.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 563–564 (“To stop . . . violations of federal patent, copyright, and trademark laws, and to
prevent the taking of a license in patent, copyright, and trademark without paying just compensation,
the jurisdiction of the federal court shall include States, state instrumentalities, state employees, and
persons acting under color of state law.”).
190
Wang, supra note 171, at 488.
191
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007.
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protect copyrights within the decade. Lobbying Congress may spur
legislatures, but it may not move enough of them for decisive
Congressional action.
From appearances, copyright owners cannot successfully lobby for
Congressional legislation of any kind. If they lobby Congress at all, it may
have to be aimed at a different Article I power. Landau suggests an
additional target for lobbying, stating that, “Congress should flex its muscle
through its spending power,” and place a waiver of sovereign immunity
condition on federal funding. 192 Professor Ghosh is sympathetic to this
approach.193 While I think Landau is correct that money will perk the ears
of the state, I do not think that using the Congressional purse is necessarily
the best road to travel. Congressional use of the spending power against the
states in the manner Landau suggests is nothing more than a bully tactic
that does not present a positive appeal to the interests of the states. There is
an additional issue of determining what type of funding should be withheld
to provoke the states to waive immunity. Congress conditioned a state’s
reception of federal highway funding on the state’s minimum age for
drinking, 194 but there is a connection between the law and interstate
travel. 195 Landau neither suggests what funding should be withheld nor
which funding relates to state copyright infringement.
It is true that legislation seems the best path available for copyright
owners, and that the waiver of sovereign immunity is the way forward;
however, the waiver should not come from the undue influence of the
Congressional purse. Instead, the waiver should come from the people of
the states.
B. State Legislation: Where the People Speak the Loudest.
The alternative to federal action is state action. At the smallest levels,
the people speak loudest; at the largest, they are easily spoken over.
Copyright owners can take advantage of this political paradox and seek
legislation on the state level that waives state sovereign immunity. Even the
U.S. Copyright Office listed state waiver of immunity in state court as a
possible remedy that remains available to solve the issue of state copyright
infringement. 196 A list of all 50 states and the District of Columbia was
attached to the report, complete with the power to waiver sovereign
192

Landau, supra note 183, at 561.
Ghosh, supra note 145, at 665.
194
23 U.S.C. § 158(a).
195
The Supreme Court drew this connection in the case upholding the statute. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–09 (1987).
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U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 60.
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immunity, the available claims, and the type of forum considered for each
individual location.197
The waiver of sovereign immunity could be legislated for specific
entities, if not for the whole state. There is some state legislation that
includes an implied acknowledgement that the state has the power to allow
copyright infringement claims to be brought against state universities198 and
to waive Eleventh Amendment protections for public universities. 199 If
states have the power to waive sovereign immunity for copyright claims,
but such power has yet to be exercised through state legislation, it seems
there remains a legislative avenue available to copyright owners that allows
them to avoid running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. The owners can
lobby the local state governments to pass laws subjecting the state to
copyright infringement claims when the states or their entities intentionally
engage in copyright infringement.
If state laws are passed that allow for copyright infringement claims to
be brought against the state or its entities, then there would not be an issue
for copyright owners like Fredrick Allen or Jim Olive. The Eleventh
Amendment only says that suits between states and citizens of other states
will not come under the jurisdiction of the United States.200 It does not say a
state cannot consent to being subjected to some kind of lawsuit, nor that a
state cannot revoke sovereign immunity for itself or its agents under certain
circumstances. Because infringement in the current cases is at the hands of
state universities,201 I propose that copyright owners lobby for legislation
that reads as follows:
No public college or university shall be immune from monetary damages
arising out of claims for copyright infringement, should the infringing act be
done for the purposes of benefitting the college or university monetarily,
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Id. at E-1–E-11.
E.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-142(b)(4) (“Nothing in this section shall . . . [s]ubject public
institutions of higher education to any suit, whether for monetary damages, injunctive relief or any
cause of action whatsoever. . . .”).
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E.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-142(b)(5) (“Nothing in this section shall . . . [b]e deemed or
construed to waive or abrogate in any way the sovereign immunity of the state, the public institutions of
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any officer or employee of the state or the public institution of higher education from suit under the
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U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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E.g. Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022) (the University of Houston); Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ.
Athletic Dep’t, 484 F. Supp. 3d 448, 452 (S.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS
3976 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert. denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603) (Texas
A&M University Athletic Department).
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administratively, or in any other fashion that might bring benefits to the school
as if it were a private business.

The legislation does not need to be worded as I have presented it, nor
does it need to be limited to copyright infringement because patent owners
can join the lobby effort. The two intellectual property owners share the
same Constitutional clause,202 and both suffered defeat at the hands of the
state before the Supreme Court. 203 Those facts alone give both groups
reason to lobby together, but even if copyright owners lobby alone, the
legislation they aim for must be limited to two things: It must be aimed at
state colleges and universities, and it must be aimed at the business-like
behavior the colleges and universities engage in when they infringe upon
copyrights.
The reasons for a specific and narrow aim in the legislation are
strategic because the lobby efforts require a legal strategy as well as a legal
theory if copyright owners are to protect their copyrights from state
infringement. First, the copyright owners must remember who they are
dealing with when they lobby the state. 204 The target audience in the
lobbying effort are the members of the state legislature (henceforth the
“assembly members”). Every state legislature consists of multiple people
with multiple interests, and many of them may not want to waive immunity
for the entire state. However, the same people may be warmer to a specific
waiver aimed at specific state entities, and such a lobbying effort will allow
the copyright owners to concentrate their efforts when they lobby the
legislature. 205 If the copyright owners aim too broadly, then the lobby
efforts will likely be scattered and poorly organized. Concentrated aim will
allow them to sharpen their arguments before the state legislatures and will
present the assembly members with an idea that does not threaten the state
as a whole but only certain state entities.
Second, specific legislation is important because the copyright owners
must remember that to lobby is to engage in some type of adverse action.
On the other side is an opponent who does not want the legislation to get
through. For waiver of sovereign immunity, the opponent is the state and
its entities, and having knowledge of what both will or will not do is
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999)
(patent); Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 944, 1007 (2020) (copyright).
204
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 137–44 (1998) (failure to know who it is you
are dealing with consistently results in blunders, from the mundane to the catastrophic).
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See id. at 171–177 (concentration on a single point is generally a good principle for achieving a
desired outcome because lacking concentration can lead to ruin).
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vital.206 The likelihood that assembly members will favor a total waiver is
highly unlikely because copyright owners are likely to face off against both
the state and those entities who might be interested in retaining immunity
for copyright infringement, such as the state Department of Education.207 If
a total waiver were granted, then more copyright owners could dip their
hands into the state wallet for money damages whenever they sue the state
or state entity for monetary damages. Thus, a total waiver is likely a battle
copyright owners will lose because the assembly members are unlikely to
risk what money the state possesses to so many potential copyright
infringement lawsuits.
However, waiving immunity for public colleges and universities limits
the copyright owners’ opponents to public universities and their employees,
both of whom appear to be the most predacious state infringers. As part of
their work with the U.S. Copyright Office,208 the Copyright Alliance issued
a survey to copyright owners, and the respondents named at least twentysix different state universities as the state entity that infringed on their
copyright.209 The evidence points almost exclusively to state colleges and
universities as the principal copyright infringers, making them the ideal
targets for waiver. This evidence is a useful lobbying tool and makes a
specific waiver an easier battle for copyright owners, and thus the one they
should fight.210 “Easier” does not mean copyright owners are certain to win;
however, if the specific evidence is presented to every assembly member,
copyright owners can force the issue of state infringement upon the
members by demanding they address the issue.211 A general waiver does not
appear to enjoy the same luxury of such forceful evidence.212
206
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 33 STRATEGIES OF WAR 165–178 (2006) (victory over an opponent
requires knowledge of who he is, including his interests, movements, and habits); see also SUN-TZU,
THE ART OF WAR 22 (John Minford trans., Penguin Classics 2014) (5th-Century BC) (“Know your
enemy . . . and victory is never in doubt.”).
207
E.g. Escholar LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 3d 414, 419–21 (D. Neb. 2020)
(Nebraska Department of Education).
208
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 2, at 31 n.175.
209
Copyright Alliance Survey Results, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE 1, 13–14 (Jan. 15, 2021)
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/additional-record-materials/copyrightalliance-response-jan-15-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK5Q-A8S7].
210
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 33 STRATEGIES OF WAR 97–122 (2006) (failure to economically pick
battles and effectively use strengths and weaknesses will cause more harm than good for long term
goals); see also SUN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR 11 (John Minford trans., Penguin Classics 2014) (5thCentury BC) (“In war, victory should be swift. If victory is slow, men tire, morale sags.”).
211
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 62–68 (1998) (although it is better to make
others come to you, at times a sudden strike that forces the issue is the better move against an opponent).
212
The waiver will still pose a threat to state monetary reserves. The Eleventh Amendment exists
because the Supreme Court held a state could be sued in federal court for money damages. See
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.). While the state can benefit
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Furthermore, it is within the best interests of the copyright owners to
lobby for legislation that is more likely to pass because it advocates for
reform to the legal system without demanding too much all at once. The
assembly members are human beings. While human beings may recognize
the need to change how a system operates, they are simultaneously resistant
when too much change is demanded all at once because change is
accompanied by the unknown, and human beings prefer the familiar over
the unknown. 213 A demand for total waiver demands immediate change
without the comforts of what is familiar and would likely meet resistance
because of the multitude of uncertainties a total waiver of immunity would
bring. For example, there would exist concerns over what happens when
states use copyright material in accordance with fair use.214 If copyrighted
material is used for education, research, or criticism, fair use is meant to
protect the user.215 A total waiver may change the system so much that it
floods the courts with litigation in cases where the state engages in fair use.
A specific waiver focused on universities and their business-like use
of copyright has no such challenge. Commercial use and the economic
effects use has on copyrighted material are factors in a fair use analysis.216
The specific waiver will focus on those two factors in relation to the
university’s infringing behavior. Thus, the familiar fair use protections217
remains while gradual change occurs. The uncertain venture can be painted
in familiar terms because copyright owners can take a page from Jim
Olive’s playbook while lobbying the legislature and claim infringement is
much like a Taking.218 While the same could be done in advocating for a
total waiver, the evidence suggests that state schools and universities are
the main culprits for copyright infringement,219 and without more evidence
of infringement from the states themselves or other state entities, a total
waiver of state sovereign immunity would remain a radical change that
from waiving immunity for public universities, the benefits from the waiver are largely rhetorical due to
a lack of evidence.
213
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 392–99 (1998) (when attempting to instigate
change, it is better to appeal to the familiar and change things gradually rather than executing reform
immediately); see also NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 182 (The Modern
Library 1940) (1531-1532) (“He who desires or attempts to reform the government of a state, and
wishes to have it accepted and capable of maintaining itself to the satisfaction of everybody, must at
least retain the semblance of the old forms. . . .”).
214
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215
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seems unnecessary. Thus, a specific waiver presented in familiar terms is
the safer road because it allows for reform in some areas without reforming
the state into completely unknown territory.
The final reason why copyright owners should aim only at the state
colleges and universities is because it allows them to stand on the moral
high ground when they lobby. 220 The arguments that copyright owners
present against state universities will be much more effective than any
broad argument against the state because of how the universities have
behaved. In Jim Olive, the University of Houston used Olive’s photograph
to advertise the business school;221 in Canada Hockey LLC. v. Texas A&M
University Athletic Department, Texas A&M used an unpublished chapter
of a writer’s book to help enforce their 12th Man trademark.222 These are
the actions of businesses, not institutions of learning. If a business engages
in copyright infringement, it would face damages for violating one of the
five exclusive rights. 223 Colleges and universities should be treated as
private businesses when they deliberately infringe on copyrights in a
business-like fashion; however, sovereign immunity allows state colleges
and universities to get away with such predacious behavior224 while private
universities are left open.
To illustrate, suppose Vanderbilt University and the University of
Tennessee infringe on the same copyrighted material. In that situation,
Vanderbilt will be targeted, even if the University of Tennessee caused
more monetary damage, simply because Vanderbilt is a private university
unprotected by sovereign immunity. Copyright owners can present these
disparities to the assembly members to show a lack of equity in the legal
system for copyright infringement. Presenting the disparity will publicly
present copyright owners as victims of unfair practices permitted by the
state, which will allow copyright owners to garner public support and
bolster the lobby effort. If done effectively, the assembly members will be
left with two options: Allow the predacious behavior of state colleges and
universities to go without access to a monetary remedy, or do the right
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See ROBERT GREENE, THE 33 STRATEGIES OF WAR 331–41(occupying the moral high ground
can garner support from the public against one’s antagonist, when the issue is framed correctly around
virtue against viciousness); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (Edwin Curley trans., Hackett
Publishing 1994) (1651) (“[S]uccessful wickedness hath obtained the name virtue, and some . . . have
allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom.”).
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thing and waive sovereign immunity for those state colleges and
universities that engage in such behavior.
There might be a concern that failing to go for a total waiver is
refusing to deal a final blow to those states and state entities engaged in
copyright infringement. While it is better to defeat an opponent totally,225
the plan of attack depends on the opponent and the location. It may be that
some assembly members are warmer to a broader waiver than what I
propose because of how important copyright is to their state and local
economies,226 while other assembly members might not see a total waiver
as a necessary move because of how little copyright contributes to the state
economy. 227 In states where there is a greater interest in protecting
copyrights and copyright owners, a broader waiver may be called for, while
states with less of an interest may not find a broad waiver appealing.
However, the evidence of infringement by state colleges and universities
appears to be sufficient enough to have a broader appeal in most, if not all,
of the states because infringement by state colleges and universities is
prevalent.228 Location may allow for a broader waiver, but specific waivers
are more likely to be effective in each state. Regardless, the specific waiver
is only a suggestion to begin an effective lobby effort in each state to
secure ways to check the predations of public universities, and is thus a
suggestion that would defeat the nationwide opponent totally.229 However,
if copyright owners perceive that the assembly members would be willing
to waive immunity for other state entities, then copyright owners can
attempt to lobby for those waivers.
C. The Road Ahead: What Challenges Exist for Copyright and
Federalism?
While the arguments and approach to state waiver are not exhaustive,
one question remains: Can waiver of sovereign immunity by the states
survive scrutiny? Even if state legislatures are somehow convinced by the
225
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 107–14 (2006) (when combating an opponent, it
is better to crush them totally rather than show them mercy); see also NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE
PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 9 (E. R. P. Vincent, ed., Luigi Ricci, trans., The Modern Library 1940)
(1531-1532) (“For it must be noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will
revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones. . . .”).
226
E.g. New York, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/resources/states/new-york/
[https://perma.cc/U9QC-K27J]. In the state of New York, the entertainment industry contributes $9
billion and creates 130,000 full-time jobs for the local state economy. Id.
227
E.g. Wyoming, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/resources/states/wyoming/
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is graphic designers at 300 people, and the state has nearly 11,000 jobs involving copyright. Id.
228
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lobbying attempts of copyright owners, will the laws they pass survive long
enough to make a difference? Here, I address some, but by no means all of
those concerns.
1. Is it Constitutional?
The initial issue that arises is the constitutionality of state waiver for
copyright infringement. If the states do not have the constitutional power to
waive their own immunity, then lobbying for waiver at the state level is a
lost cause. The answer will likely turn on the Constitutional text and the
case law on the issue.
The Eleventh Amendment is silent on state waiver of sovereign
immunity;230 however, the Tenth Amendment, by reserving power for the
state provided that those powers were not first “delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,” 231 helps
establish the bounds within which states can work regarding sovereign
immunity. The Constitution does not delegate the power to waiving state
sovereign immunity to the United States, nor does it forbid states from
doing it themselves. Additionally, the dissent in Florida Prepaid concluded
that the Supreme Court granted the states the power to waive their own
immunity for patent infringement cases.232 Thus, the power exists, both by
the Constitutional text and case law. Because the Court heavily relied on
Florida Prepaid when deciding Allen, 233 it is no stretch to suggest the
principle that applied to patent infringement also applies to copyright
infringement. Therefore, state waiver of sovereign immunity for copyright
infringement is unlikely to conflict with the United States Constitution.
2. What About the Dormant Commerce Clause?
The next issue will be Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. Suppose
Pennsylvania waives immunity for copyright infringement, but New York
does not. Pennsylvania State then infringes on a New Yorker’s copyrighted
work, and the New Yorker sues Pennsylvania State. The survival of the
waiver hinges on whether the statute violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
Under the current Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the party
contesting the waiver will have to prove that the statute in question
230

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
U.S. Const. amend. X.
232
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 664–65
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday, this Court once again demonstrates itself to be the champion of
States’ rights. In this case, it seeks to guarantee rights the States themselves did not express any
particular desire in possessing: during Congress’ hearings on the Patent Remedy Act, although invited
to do so, the States chose not to testify in opposition to the abrogation of their immunity.”).
233
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
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“discriminates against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic
actors.”234 Copyrighted materials are goods because copyright attaches to
things such as literary and musical works,235 all of which can be sold within
and across state lines. The economic actors involved with the copyrighted
material would be the buyers and sellers of the goods as well as the
copyright owner. Because profits can be recovered as part of the damages
for copyright infringement,236 and the impact on the potential market is a
factor that is considered in a fair use analysis,237 there is a strong case that
copyright and copyright infringement can play a part in interstate
commerce.
However, challenging state waiver for copyright infringement through
a Dormant Commerce Clause argument is problematic, primarily because a
state waiver of sovereign immunity for copyright infringement
discriminates against no one, as is required under a Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 238 Even though the Eleventh Amendment bars diversity
actions where the state is a party,239 the waiver of immunity should allow a
New Yorker to sue Pennsylvania State for copyright infringement as easily
as it would allow a Pennsylvanian to do the same. State waiver would not
know a resident from a nonresident, or differentiate between the
copyrighted material coming from one state and the copyrighted material
coming from another state. All copyrights and copyrighted material for
every copyright owner is protected at all times with a state waiver of
sovereign immunity. Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause would not be
violated with a waiver of sovereign immunity because discrimination
between state residents and state goods does not exist.240
3. Will Waiver Limit Educational Use for Public Universities?
Waiving immunity for public universities in copyright infringement
cases will cause concern about how it will affect the use of copyright
material in education. While this concern is warranted because educational
institutions use copyrighted material, using copyright material for
educational purposes is already covered by the fair use section of the
Copyright Act. 241 If a state law attempts to waive immunity for state
234

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462 (2019) (citations
omitted).
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17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(2).
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17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
237
17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2461.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2461.
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See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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universities in cases where copyrighted material is used for educational
purposes, the state law would likely be preempted by the federal statute.242
Supposing, however, that the federal law will not preempt the state
waiver, the state law can explicitly assure that universities are safe to use
copyright material for educational purposes, so long as the fair use factors
are satisfied. 243 Tennessee, for example, provided that assurance when it
passed a law concerning the use of copyrighted material by students at
universities that have student residential computer networks. 244 In fact,
copyright owners should advocate for an explicit provision in the waiver
that protects universities from lawsuits where copyrighted material is used
for educational purposes. Not only will copyright owners address the
concerns over educational use, but they will also retain the moral high
ground. 245 They will present themselves as supports of education, not
opponents to it. Thus, including an explicit provision that protects
educational use will both address concerns about limiting use of
copyrighted material in education and bolster the lobby effort.
4. Will State Waiver of Immunity Survive State Level Scrutiny?
The final hurdle is the survival of state waiver at the state level.
Assuming the state decides to waive sovereign immunity for state
copyright infringement, and said waiver survives federal scrutiny, the state
or state entities being sued could still challenge the waiver in state court.
There are some states that have waived sovereign immunity for certain
cases by way of their constitution.246 Others states have waived immunity
by statute for a limited time.247 However, there are states with constitutional
provisions specifying no wavier of immunity,248 with such provisions being
recognized by both state courts249 and federal courts.250 Thus, while some
242

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-142(b)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall . . . [r]estrict an educational
institution’s use of copyrighted material under 17 U.S.C. § 107. . . .”).
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Supra note 220.
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See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a)(1)(A) (“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . and only if the
taking, damage, or destruction is for the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property . . . by the State,
a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large. . . .”). The Texas Supreme Court has ruled this
is a waiver of state sovereign immunity in state court for Takings claims. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d
639, 643 (Tex. 2007).
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See Fla. Stat. § 11.065(1) (2021) (“No claims against the state shall be presented to the
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states will have an easier time waiving immunity by statute, others may
have to waive immunity by state constitutional amendment.
Constitutional amendment will be difficult, but the price of federalism
is that each state retains the power to choose how to govern their own
people. Copyright owners will have to contend with the respective
jurisdictions and choose their attacks wisely. If all else fails, copyright
owners can flee the states that will not protect their copyrights against state
universities and deprive those states of any monetary or material benefit
that may result from the copyrighted material. A survey of the cases
involving state schools infringing on copyrights suggests the various
copyright owners can impact state economies through flight. Of the
published cases involving universities and educational institutions over the
past twenty years, at least three involved photographers,251 one involved a
writer,252 four involved businesses and organizations,253 and two involved
school employees.254 In each case, the plaintiffs held copyrighted material
and alleged copyright infringement from the universities and educational
institutions. Broken down, each group individually contributes to the
economies of the states where they work, and in some cases provide direct
benefit to the schools as employees.
If copyright owners leave or avoid the states that do not protect their
copyrights from the predations of universities, the state economies would
be negatively affected. It would be hitting the states in the pocketbook as
Landau suggested, 255 but the attack will come from potential revenue
generated by state taxes and the state economy, not federal withholding of
funds. It would also appeal to the state’s self-interest because a state is
interested in keeping and increasing its tax base so as to accumulate more
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tax revenue.256 The threat of the state’s finances being negatively impacted
by the exodus of copyright owners without a state waiver is great leverage.
Alternatively, a waiver could positively impact state revenue because it
would be a signal and invitation to other copyright owners to move to the
state for the favorable copyright protections. This type of appeal to state
financial interests is better than the use of the Congressional purse.
It is true that state abrogation of sovereign immunity for copyright
infringement is uncertain. On the one hand, the states may see the need for
such reform because state universities are infringing copyrights in businesslike fashion while simultaneously hiding behind sovereign immunity.257 On
the other hand, the state may want to avoid such reform because there are
times where they may be the infringer.258 While this makes the likelihood of
state legislation a tossup, it demonstrates a need for specific waiver over
total waiver, rather than an insurmountable challenge to passing any waiver.
The states may be less inclined to waive immunity for each and every
portion of the state; however, they may be warm to waiving immunity in
those circumstances where state entities abuse the privilege of sovereign
immunity while infringing on copyrights. If copyright owners tailor their
arguments accordingly, the odds of passing legislation may not only lean in
their favor, but it may even survive judicial scrutiny at the state level.259
256
See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 95–100 (1998) (although you can appeal to the
charity and goodwill of people in power when asking for their help, obtaining their aid generally
requires an appeal to their self-interest). While I acknowledge Greene’s law could work well with a
strategy demanding a total waiver of sovereign immunity, I believe that the demand for total waiver
inevitably cuts against the state’s self-interest because a total waiver allows the state and any of its
entities to be sued for copyright infringement, be it from citizens or non-citizens, and that does more to
threaten the state’s revenue than does the loss of the state’s possible copyright industry; however, I will
admit that appealing to the state’s economic self-interest could work when lobbying for total waiver in
some states.
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denied, 142 S. Ct. 1361 (2022); Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t, 484 F. Supp. 3d 448,
452 (S.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, No. 20-20503, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3976 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022), cert.
denied, 91 U.S.L.W. 3066 (Oct. 3, 2022) (No. 21-1603).
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259
The three issues above are by no means the only ones that could arise with the waiver of
sovereign immunity. Other issues include the effectiveness of the waivers themselves because waiver of
immunity in one state does not mean immunity is waived for entities in another state. For example,
suppose the copyright owner is a photographer from North Carolina and her photos are infringed upon
by the University of South Carolina. The copyright owner’s recovery is likely dependent on whether
South Carolina has waived sovereign immunity because the University of South Carolina is an entity of
a sovereign state other than North Carolina. Even if South Carolina waives immunity, there is a chance
the law waiving immunity is less favorable to copyright owners than the waiver in North Carolina. Thus,
if state waivers are relied upon as the best approach, recovery and favorable treatment for copyright
infringement may vary from state to state. While this is a weakness of relying on state waivers for
copyright infringement, it could potentially work in the favor of copyright owners seeking federal
legislation on the issue. If the waivers create an unequal balance amongst the states for diversity cases
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CONCLUSION
The rights of copyright owners following infringement by the state or
its entities is limited in scope. The owners still have some remedies
available, such as injunctive relief, but such a remedy does not solve any
damages problems that might arise from state copyright infringement.260
While there is still a chance that copyright owners may get to test Takings
claims for copyright infringement in the Supreme Court, such claims will
face their own respective difficulties. Attorneys have room to maneuver
with these claims in most state courts and federal courts because there is no
binding precedent from the highest court in the land, but it is a gamble
copyright owners might not want to make.
If copyright owners want to take control of the matter themselves, it is
best for them to concentrate their efforts on the smallest scale possible and
lobby the state legislatures for a waiver of sovereign immunity. By aiming
at state universities specifically, they are more likely to get legislation
passed than they would going for total waiver. This tactic may seem like
weak tea to some, but it is the best foundation for further legislation. Once
a state or an entity other than a state university engages in copyright
infringement, the legislation waiving immunity against universities will
become the basis to lobby for more waivers. The chances for copyright
infringement claims being brought against the state are not lost. The basis
for the claims only needs to be tempered so that it can get where copyright
owners want it to be.

involving state copyright infringement, the unequal balance will be a great foundation for lobbying
Congress to pass laws resolving the matter. Thus, what starts as a weakness for state waivers of
sovereign immunity ends as a strength for Congressional lobbying.
260
See Bloom, supra note 14.
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